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It is both disappointing and exhilarating to re-examine the functions 
of trade secrecy law for this volume. The disappoilltment stems from 
encountering many of the same old questions that Reichman, Samuelson 
and Scotchmer have addressed over a 20-year period. l The exhilaration 
comes from rereading that brilliant article by Samuelson and Scotchmer 
on reverse engineering at some distance, and realizing how many questions 
these collective efforts managed to answer. So let me try to set the record 
straight in a few short pages, beginning with the question of whether or 
not it is better to treat trade secrecy law as a form of intellectual property 
law rather than as a business tort under unfair competition law.2 
I. TRADE SECRETS AS A FORM OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
The logical point of departure is to observe that 'intellectual property' has 
never been just about exclusive rights in intangible, non-rivalrous crea-
tions. It has always included conduct-based liability rules found in some 
sui generis regimes, as well as absolute liability rules that confer only a 
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1 I.H. Reichman, Charting the Collapse of the Patent-Copyright Dichotomy: 
Premises for a Restructured International Intellectual Property System, 13 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 475, 504-17 (1995); J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the 
Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2432, 2504-57 (1994); Pamela 
Samuelson and Susan Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse Engineering, 
888 YALE L.J. 1575 (2002). 
2 Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as 
Intellectual Property Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 311, 315~53 (2008) (discussing 
the origins of trade secrecy law in torts, then constructing an IP theory of trade 
secrets); see also Gustavo Ghidini and Valeria Falce, Chapter 6. 
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'license of right' yielding reasonable royalties, as occurs with mechani-
cal recordings under copyright law and, in most countries, with public 
performances of sound recordings under neighborIng rigl)ts Jaws.3 All of 
these are 'intelleCtual property', which the classical tradition subdivides 
into 'industrial property' and 'literary and artistic property' (including 
neighboring rights laws).4 
Formally, when international intellectual property law first recognized 
trade secrets under Article 39 of the TRIPS Agreement, the drafters 
deliberately inserted it into Article I Obis of the Paris Convention, whictt 
regulates unfair competition norms as a subset of industrial property law.5 
The purpose of this move was to emphasize that Article 39 of the TRIPS 
Agreement had, in and of itself, not created any exclusive rights. Rather, it 
had recognized trade secret protection as a specification of the obligations 
to avoid unfair competition in international trade already set out in the 
Paris Convention. Unfortunately, the drafters of Article 39, which tracked 
the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) in the United States,6 failed 
expressly to mention lawful reverse engineering. Yet, the understanding 
that reverse engineering is privileged perfects and operationalizes trade 
secret protection in the United States; its very purpose is to generate more 
innovation than would otherwise occur. 7 
If we think of intellectual property rights only as comprising exclusive 
rights, labeling trade secrets as 'intellectual property' deforms the entire 
history of trade secrecy law. But if we broaden our understanding of 
intellectual property to include all forms of property rights in intangible, 
non-rivalrous creations, including ex ante and ex post liability rules, then 
3 See 17 U.S.c. §115 (2006); International Convention for '(he Proiectionof 
Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations, Rome, 
-Italy, October 26, 1961,496 V.N.T.S. 43 (,Rome Convention'), Art. 12. 
4 See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 
September 9, 1886, as last revised at Paris, July 24, 1971, 828 V.N.T.S. 221 
(,Berne Convention')~ Arts. I, 2; Paris Convention for the Protection ofIndustrial 
Prqperty, March 29, 1&83, as revised at Stockholm, July 14, 1967, V.S.T. 1583 
('Paris ConveI1tjon'), Art. 1(1), (3); Rome Conyen.tion, Arts. 4-6. 
5 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, April 
15,1994,33 l.L.M. 81 (1994) (,TRIPS Agreement'), Art. 39.1; Paris Convention, 
Art. 10bis. See generally Jerome H. Reichman, Rethinking the Role of Clinical 
,Trial Data in International Intellectual Property Law: The Case for a Public Goods 
Approach, 13 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. I, 17-22 (2009). 
6 Compare Vniform Trade Secrets Act, §1(2) 14V.L.A. 438 (1985) with 
TRIPS Agreement, Art. 39.2. 
7 See generally Samuelson and Scotchmer, supra note I; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF TORTS §43 (1995) ('Independent discovery and analysis of publicly available 
products or information are not improper means of acquisition') . 
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we may say that there is a property right in trade secrets in the form of an 
entitlement to either lead time or compensation for ~ost lead time due to a 
wrongful appropriation. While there mayor may not be an injunction to 
enforce that entitlement, the cOPlpensation is properly measured only in 
terms of the loss of lead time that it would have taken a routine engineer 
to reverse engineer the trade secret by honest means. 
The modality of enforcement via an injunction in such cases does not 
convert trade secrecy law into a regime of exclusive property rights. It 
remains a conduct-based liability rule, but no less a property right, in the 
sense of an ex ante entitlement. It is, however, a peculiar property right, in 
that a third party's reverse engineering by -honest means will truncate its 
existence without more. As the late Professor John C.,Stedman accurately 
observed ll} 1962, it is 'a disappearing property right', unlike any other in 
that respect.8 ' 
It follows that treating trade secrets as an 'intellectual property right' 
does little in ~tselfto advance our understanding. We must push on to con-
sider what exactly trade secrecy law protects, and what its true normative 
function really is. 
II. TRADE SECRECY LAW PROTECTS 
INVESTMENT IN INNOVATION AS SUCH 
Viewed as a subset of intellectual property law, the distinctive characteristic 
of trade secrecy law is that itprotects investment in innovation as such. Until 
the 1990s, when Switzerland tried to codify a misappropriation law for this 
very purpose (as Owen Paepke long ago desired),9 this distinctive aspect 
of trade secrecy law was virtually unique. IO By their nature, virtually all 
other so-called intellectual property rights (disregarding trademarks and 
th~ like) provideexclu_sive, non~exclusive or semi-exclusive rights to some 
predefined product of intellectual creativity, such as 'inventions' in :patent 
8 See John C. Stedman, Trade Secrets, 23 OHIO STATE L.J. 4, 8 (1962). 
9 See F,ederal Law on Unfair Competition of December 1986, art. 5(c) (effec-
tive March 1', 1988) (Switz); Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 1, at 2474-6; 
C. Owen Paepke, An Economic Interpretation of the Misappropriation Doctrine: 
Common Law Protection for Investments in Innovation, 2 HIGH TECH. LJ. 65 
(1987); see also Douglas Gary Lichtman, The Economics of Innovation: Protecting 
Unpatentable Goods, 81 MINN. L. REV. 693 (1997). 
10 But see Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 1, at 2477-8 (describing the 
protection of construction project designs by means of an ex ante liability rule 
under art. 99 of the Italian Copyright Law). 
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law, 'literary and artistic works' in copyright law, 'ornamental designs' 
(appearance designs) ih design protection laws, or 'distinctive varieties' in 
plant variety protection law. ll These intellectual property rights, in turn, 
typically depend on the attainment of a specified level of creativity, as 
manifested in a specified type of intellectual creation, which will last for a 
specified period of time. The end result is to enable the creator to recoup 
his or her investment and turn a profit in the intangible, non-rivalrous 
creation, which might otherwise be duplicated rapidly (despite potentially 
high front-end costs, including R&D costs, where applicable) and dissemi-
nated at relatively low marginal costs of reproduction. 
As Stephen Ladas once explained, what trade secrecy law protects is 
an entrepreneur's investment in applications of know-how to industry, 
which mayor may not rise to the level of a non-obvious invention. I2 In 
this context: 
know-how consists of information about how to achieve some technical or 
commercial advantage ove,r competitors, typically by means of novel methods 
or processes of production. Such information mayor may not be secret. If 
secret, it may be held only under actual, but not legal, secrecy, which in turn 
affects the degree of protection the law affords. 13 
This concept of know-how applied to industry has been successfully 
invoked to address the appropriation problems of innovations as diverse 
as applications interfaces in platform information technologies,I4 tradi-
tional knowledge generated by indigenous communities, 15 and clinical trial 
data. I6 It therefore seems pointless to try to define the subject matter of 
trade secrecy laws in any other terms, although we must recognize that this 
same' know-how may sometimes also qualify for protection as confidential 
information on other grounds and with different policies in mind. I7 
11 See generally id. at 2448-72. 
12 STEPHEN P. LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND RELATED RIGHTS: NATIONAL 
AND INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 1616 (1975). 
13 Id.atI617. 
14 Samuelson and Scotchmer, supra note 1. 
15 Jerome H. Reichman and Tracy Lewis, Using Liability Rules to Stimulate 
Innovation in Developing Countries: Application to Traditional Knowledge, 
in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A 
GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 321 (Keith E. Maskus and Jerome 
H. Reichman eds., Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
16 Reichman, Role of Clinical Trial Data, supra note 5. 
17 See generally J.H. Reichman, Overlapping Proprietary Rights in University-
Generated Research Products: The Case of Computer Programs, 17 COLUM. J.L. & 
ARTS 51 (1992). 
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Precisely because we are dealing with investments in know-how applied 
to industry as such, and not specified levels of creative achievement, classical 
trade secrecy law confers no exclusive property r.ights Whatsoever. Rather, it 
provides a legal entitlement to a period of what I have earlier called 'natural 
lead time', during which a second comer may reverse engineer the origi-
nator's know-how from publicly available exemplars by honest means. 18 
Even for products of ordinary manufacture, this period of lead time could 
have been relatively long when the industrial revolution first got underway, 
although lead times today tend to be relatively short on the whole. 19 
Short or long, lead time conceptually enables a first comer to recoup 
investment in R&D and to establish distinguishing trademarks that 
help to preserve profits against second comers who successfully reverse 
engineer the otherwise unprotected know-how.2o More importantly, the 
process of reverse engineering itself, by methodically extracting the inno-
vator's know-how from a given application, tends to generate technical 
improvements over time, including cost-saving modes of manufacture 
that reduce prices to consumers.21 For example, the ballpoint pen, which 
entered the market through jewelry stores at U.S.$70 per piece, is now 
available to everyone at 7¢ a piece. 
In so doing, trade secrecy law promotes healthy competition by secur-
ing investors in innovative applications of know-how to industry against 
market-destructive forms of free riding, while simultaneously stimulating 
these same third-party competitors to contribute to the technical commu-
nity's aggregate costs of research and development: 
In all cases, liability rules govern in the sense that, without permission, second-
comers may extract and improve preexisting industrial applications of know-
how as long as, in the absence of any contractual agreement to the contrary, 
they either defray the costs of reverse engineering or pay the equivalent costs of 
having usurped lead-time advantages by improper means.22 
18' Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 1, at 2439, and n.25. 
19 See J.H. Reichman, Of Green Tulips and Legal Kudzu: Repackaging Rights in 
Subpatentable Innovation, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1743, ~ 750-1 (2000). 
20 Of course, the second comer may prefer to purchase a license from the origi-
nator when the costs and/or the difficulties of reverse engineering appear formida-
ble. See Samuelson and Scotchmer, supra note 1. 
21 See, e.g., Leo J. Raskind, The Misappropriation Doctrine as a Competitive 
Norm of Intellectual Property Law, 75 MINN. L. REV. 875 (1991); Leo J. 
Raskind, The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984 and Its Lessons: Reverse 
Engineering, Unfair Competition, and Fair Use, 70 MINN. L. REV. 385 (1985). 
22 J. H. Reichman, Saving the Patent Law from Itself, in PERSPECTIVES ON 
PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 289,293 (F. Scott Kieff ed., Elsevier 
Press, 2003). 
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From these observations, two important Gonclusions follow that merit 
further attention. First, the conduct-based liability rules of trade secrecy 
law were the primary vehicle for stimulating investment in innovative 
enterprise after the i_ndustrial revolution. This conclusion follows because 
most innovation consists -of cumulative apd sequential applications of 
know-how to industry by routine engineers at work on common techni-
cal trajectorie_s. Given relatively high standards of non-obviousness in 
patent law, as well as the possibilities for inventing around patel)ts once 
issued, most,commercial ventures depended on the conduct-based liability 
rules of trade secrecy law (and otht<r unfair competition laws, as well as 
trademark law) for opportunities to recoup their investments in R&D.23 
In this sense, trade secrecy laws mediated between the strong protection 
of patents, when available, and the risk of wholesale duplication (that is, 
the risk of zero lead time) in a totally unregutated environment of unbri-
dled copying, as occurred in many developing countries b!'!fore tbe TRIPS 
Agreement entered into force. 
The second and more far-reaching conclusion is that this classical 
system of innovation gave rise to a naturally occurring 'pool oftechnologi-
cal resources that was openly available to all routine engineers who played 
by the rules. ,Because this proposjtiop has attracted insufficient study, it 
deserves a closer look here. 
III. A NATURAL OPEN-SOURCE TECBNOLOGY 
POOL 
The exclusive rights of classical intellectual property law may be viewed 
as operating in the space left free by two other regimes tl}at intersect 
with them but which are governed by totally different principles. The 
three regimes taken together provide a rough map or outline of the clas-
sical system of innovation inherited from the industrial revolution. This 
scheme is represented in Figure 8.P4 At the top of the diagram, lies the 
'upstream' dimension, as it would be called today, in which scientific 
and technical knowledge is generated by the public science community, 
typically working at universities or other research centers. This basic 
research is often funded by government entities (in the United States, 
23 See Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 1; Reichman, Green Tulips, supra 
note 19. Hence the old saying that intellectual property law provided only 'islands 
of protection in a sea of fr~e competition', which is no longer in vogue today. 
24 Reproduced and modified from Reichman, Saving the Patent System, supra 
note 22, at 292 . 
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COMMONS 
Basic scientific and technical information 
ZONE I 
Truly non-obvious inventions 
ZONE 2 
Routine innovation 
(i~cludes small-scale 'inventions') 
ZONE 3 
Hybrid regimes 
(utility models, etc.) 
Applications of know-how to industry 
SEMI COMMONS 
Traditional trade secrets law 
Figure 8.1 Expansion of exclusive rights in lieu of actual or legal secrecy 
this would include the National Science Foundation (NSF), the National 
Institutes of Health (NIH), or the Department of Energy (DOE)), as well 
as by universities themselves, foundations, and even private industry, in 
support. of basic research that ca~ lead to downstream applications.25 In 
its most enlightened embodiment, this sphere of activity is one in which 
scientific and technical information flow freely as a relatively unregulated 
input, governed by the norms of science.26 Subject to growing pressures 
of a legal, technical and ecopoIl).ic nature, the scientific and technical 
data and information generated here are, in principle, destined to become 
freely available to other scientists in what ideally approximates a true 
25 See, e.g., Arti K. Rai and Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole and the Progress 
of Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289 (2003); Anthony So et al., IS Bayh-
Dole Good for Developing Countries? Lessons from the U. S. Experience, 6 PLOS 
BIOLOGY 2078 (2008), available at www.plosbiology.orgJarticle/info:doillO.l3711 
journal.pbio.0060262. 
26 Arti K. Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and 
the Norms of Science, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 77 (1999). 
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commons, one that has played a fundamental role in our national system 
of innovation. 27 
It is, however, in the lesser-known domain, deep in the bowels of the 
free enterprise economy, where scientific and technical know-how are 
applied to industry, that we must focus primary attention in this chapter. 
In Figure 8.1, this space is represented as lying under the sphere in which 
the exclusive rights of intellectual property law otherwise predominate 
(Zones 2 and 3). In this vast space, trade secrecy laws traditionally govern 
the productions of routine engineers who develop applications of know-
how to industry without securing patent protection.28 
Within this space, the reverse engineering clause built into the trade 
secret paradigm operates as an open ipvitation to third parties to make use 
of the first comer's innovative know-how for certain purposes, especially 
for devising improvements, or in exchange for compensation. The routine 
engineers working on common technical trajectories thus basically consti-
tute an interrelated group that operates under a de facto sharing ethos. As 
explained in an earlier article: 
[t]hey form a natural, open-source community built around the practice of 
reverse engineering and the availability of adequate lead time under the liability 
rules governing trade secrets and confidential information. In this endeavor, 
routine engineers depend on the reciprocal insights and contributions that the 
relevant technical communities derive from the [pooled] domain - the shared 
body of knowledge that underlies the common technical trajectories - and on 
their inability to remove novel insights and cumulative contributions to know-
how from [that domainj,29 
However, unlike the scientific commons depicted 'upstream', the newest 
technical knowledge emerging in real time under the aegis oftrade secrecy 
laws is typically available to routine engineers only on condition either 
27 See, .e.g., Paul David, The Economic Logic of 'Open Science' and the 
Balance Between Private Property Rights and the Public Domain in Scientific 
Data and Information: A Primer, in THE ROLE OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL 
DATA AND INFORMATION IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 19 (Julie M. Esanil and Paul F. 
Uhlir eds., NAS Press, 2003); J. H. Reichman and Paul F. Uhlir, A Contractually 
Reconstructed Research Commons for Scientific Data in a Highly Protectionist 
Intellectual Property Environment, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. STUD. 315 (2003); see 
also Michael J. Madison, Brett M .. Frischmann and Katherine J. Strandburg, 
Constructing Commons in the Cultural Environment, 95 CORNELL L. Rev. 657 
(2010). 
28 Reichman, Collapse of the Patent-Copyright Dichotomy, supra note I; 
Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 1. 
29 Reichman, Saving the Patent System, supra note 22, at 294. 
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that they il1vest time, money and effort to reverse engineer the first comer's 
know-how from publicly available embodiments by honest means, or that 
they negotiate upfront licensing agreements and pay directly to acquire 
such unpublished, up-to-date know-how. In this respect, the technical 
knowledge generated by routine engineers under trade secrecy laws also 
differs from .that generated by patent laws, which enters the public domain 
by virtue of disclosure and publication rules. Because the up-to-date, 
unpublished knowledge generated by routine engineers is only available to 
those willing to defray either the costs of recreating it from scratch, or the 
costs of reverse engineering it by honest means, or the costs of licens.ing it, 
we are constrained to depict the vast space emerging from their collective 
efforts as a 'semi-commons', operating on pay-to-pl,ay principles, rather 
than as a true commons or public domain in which everything is freely 
available to all comers: 
The collective knowledge available from [this semi-commons] ... advances by 
dint of the small-scale contributions of single innovators. These contributions 
are statist.ically predictable in the sense that they [usually] inhere in what was 
already known about existing technical paradigms ... The progressive develop-
ment of know-how is thus a community project that benefits from the countless 
small-scale contributions to the prior art by individuals who draw from [both] 
the public domain [and the semi-commons] to make improvements, and who 
thereby enrich the [semi-commons] by generating new information that others 
in the technical community may exploit to their own advantage. 30 
Historically, the legal protection of trade secrets was accordingly 
organized around a distinctive class of liability rules that stimulated 
competition in subpatentable improvements by discouraging market-
destructive conduct harmful to the relevant technical community as a 
whole. This regime did not endow single innovators with any power to 
remove their subpatentable or otherwise unpatented contributions from 
the semicommons, as exclusive rights would otherwise allow. On the con-
trary, trade secrecy law's traditional role was to avoid market failure by 
enabling entrepreneurs to recoup their investments in small-scale innova-
tion without creating barriers to entry and without impeding qualified 
second comers from mals:ing follow-on applications of others' routine 
innovations. 
30 !d. Here we must concede the possibility that an innovator whose creation 
rises to the level of a patentable invention may prefer to remain in trade secrecy 
law if the risks and costs of reverse engineering appear very high. See Lemley, supra 
note 2; Samuelson and Scotchmer, supra note 1. 
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IV. PROBLEMS OF SELF-REVEALING KNOW-HOW 
AND SMALL-SCALE INNOVATION GENERALLY 
From Figure 8.1, it becomes evident that the space available for both 
common use of 'public scientific and technical information at the top, 
and the space available for applications of know-how at the bottom, will 
either shrink or expand according to the amount of room occupied by the 
exclusive rights regimes on both sides of the circle. Within the circle, in 
Zone 1, are innovations that qualify for patent protection as non-obvious 
inventions. The size of this space varies with the judicial rigor of the non-
obviousness standard, which, until recently, had become relatively low. 
In Zones 2 and 3, one finds all the subpatentable innovations that could 
not qualify for patent protection under the extant non-obviousness stand-
ard but which could conceivably qualify for trade secrecy protection if kept 
legally secret within the conditions set by the UTSA.31 Because, however, 
lots of valuable ~now-tlOw is borne on or near the face of products distrib-
uted in the open market, investors often obtain little or no lead time because 
second comers can rapidly duplicate the visible know-how without spend-
ing time or money to reverse engineer it from scratch. Legislators increas-
ingly respond to this risk of market failure by enacting sui generis exclusive 
property rights in small-scale innovations, such as industrial designs, utility 
models, plant breeders' varieties, compilations of data, and the like. As 
these 'legal hybrid' regimes proliferate in Zone 3, the natural semicommons 
available to all competitors below the circle correspondingly contracts. 
No one familiar with my previous work will be surprised to learn that, 
owing to a proliferation of hybrid intellectual property regimes, coupled 
with an expansion of both the domestic and internatIonal patent and 
copyright laws,32 both the science commons and the routine engineers' 
technology pool have lately shrunk in a striking and, many would say, a 
most alarming fashion. 33 Professor James Boyle has felicitously called this 
and related phenomena 'The Second Enclosure. Movement'.34 
31 See, e.g., Robert Denicola, Chapter 2. Robert G. Bone, Chapter 3. 
32 See, e.g., Keith E. Maskus and Jerome H. Reichman, The Globalization 
of Private Knowledge Goods and the Privatization of Global Public Goods, in 
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY, supra note 15, ch. 1. 
33 Reichman, Collapse of the Patent - Copyright Dichotomy, supra note 1; 
Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 1; Pameia Samuelson et aI., A Manifesto 
Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308 
(1994). 
34 James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the 
Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33 (2003); see also David Lange, 
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V. PRESERVING THE COMMONS IN A HYPER-
PROTECTIONIST LEGAL ENVIRONMENT 
In his article proclaiming the virtues of trade secrecy law as an intellectual 
property right, Professor Lemley rightly points out that a positive eco-
nomic effect of this law is to discourage excessive or wasteful investment 
in maintaining actual secrecy, which would be necessary in the absence 
of the protection guaranteed by the tenets of trade secrecy law itself.35 At 
the same time, Professor Lemley dismisses self-revealing innovation that 
can be copied without reverse engineering as of little or no consequence, 
for the logical reason that, lacking secrecy, it cannot be covered by a law 
dedicated to the legal protection of secrets. 
In reality, that proposition, despite its apparent logic, remains empiri-
cally anachronistic in the sense that worldwide intellectual property law 
has rejected it by refusing to condemn what I have called 'incremental 
innovation 'bearing know-how on its face'36 to the public domain, where 
Lemley believes it belongs. Disregarding the United States, the rest of the 
world tends to protect such small-scale, self-revealing know-how under 
utility model laws (petty patent law), design protection laws, plant variety 
protection laws (also available in the United States), database protection 
laws, codified misappropriation laws, and numerous other hybrid legal 
regimes.3? The common' denominator of such regimes is that they protect 
small-scale innovations that lack sufficient novelty to qualify for patent 
protection and that cannot realistically trigger the secrecy requirement of 
trade secrecy law either. 
Because such innovation tends to bear its investor's know-how on or 
near its face, second comers (not otherwise legally impeded) can simply 
extract that know-how by duplicating the products that embody it, 
without any corresponding costs or time inherent in the process of reverse 
engineering. In the raw state of affairs, the innovator thus obtains zero 
lead time in which to recoup his investment in R&D, and the second comer 
free rides on the first comer's investment, while avoiding any similar cost 
Recognizing the Public Domain, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147 (1981); Jessica 
Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1996). 
35 Lemley, supra note 2. 
36 See J.H. Reichman, Computer Programs as Applied Scientific Know-How: 
Implications of Copyright Protection for Commercialized University Research, 452 
VAND. L. REV. 639 (1989). 
37 Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 1, at 2453-504; Reichman, Green 
Tulips, supra note 19, at 1753-6; see also Mark Janis, Second Tier Patent 
Protection, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 151 (1999). 
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structure of his own.38 The hybrid sui generis regimes seek to rectify these 
disincentives to invest by substituting copyright-like or patent-like regimes 
of exclusive property rights for the absence of lead time protection under 
trade secrecy law.39 
In the United States, instead, where there is officially no utility model 
law, the patent authorities periodically lower the non-obviousness stand-
ard to the point where the patent law itself absorbs an increasingly larger 
share of the small-scale innovations elsewhere covered by hybrid legal 
regimes. Thus U.S. patent law protected the paper clip,4o which is the quin-
tessential type of self-revealing functional design that utility model laws 
protect in other countries. Indeed, the low non-obviousness standard prac-
ticed in the United States until recently means that U.S. patent law peri-
odically operates as a de facto utility model law in many industria.! sectors. 
However, a low non-obviousness standard generates high social costs 
of its own. It blurs the boundaries between inventions, generating litiga-
tion and other high transaction costS.41 More important, it shrinks both 
the domain of upstream basic research results freely available to scieI)tists 
and the downstream domain of small-scale innovation available to routine 
engineers.42 In response, the U.S. Supreme Court periodically elevates the 
standard of non-obviousness, as it recently did in the KSR decision of 
2008,43 in an effort to promote the granting of 'quality patents'. 
An inevitable consequence of these decisions is that a large swath of 
small-scale ip!!ovations, which can readily be duplicated, will fall out 
of patent protection, only to receive little or no protection in trade secrecy 
law because they will tend to bear their know-how on or near the face of 
the products that embody them. Given the predictable outbreak of free 
riding likely to ensue, and the corresponding disincentives to invest it 
fosters, one should expect both state apd federal courts to push back by 
invoking various and often questionable doctrines of uI)fair competition 
law, as well as trademark or trade dress laws, which can become even more 
anticompetitive than the proliferating hybrid intellectual property rights 
under foreign laws. Whether recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions limiting 
38 Raskind, Misappropriation, supra note 21; Samuelson and Scotchmer, supra 
note 1. 
39 Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 1. 
40 See Lemley, supra note 2. 
41 See Jerome H. Reichman and Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Harmonization 
Without Consensus: Critical Reflections on Drafting a Substantive Patent Law 
Treaty, 57 DUKE L.J. 85 (2007) (citing authorities). 
42 Cj Boyle, supra note 34. 
43 KSR Int'l Co. v. Telefiex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
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the use of such ancillary doctrines to supply artificial lead time where 
otherwise un~vailable would hold up against this tide,44 should it emerge, 
remains to be seen. 
In Of Green Tulips and Legal Kudzu, which. appeared in 2000,45 I argued 
that, while it was unsustainable to cast the bulk of present-day small-scale 
innovations, with their high front~end costs and ease of duplication, into 
a world of zero lead time, it was also wrongheaded to address the chronic 
failure of secrecy under trade secrecy law by means of an expanding set of 
exclusive property rights that generate overlapping legal entitlements, high 
transaction costs, and barriers to entry, all of which seriously diminish both 
innovation and the pace of competition. Above all, the greatest long-term 
social costs of this flawed strategy are a reduction of upstream inputs into 
public science (most dramatically under database protection cum copyright 
laws) and of downstream inputs into applications of know-how to industry. 
The correct solution to this problem, in my view, is to replace the failing 
liability rule of domestic trade secrecy laws, where secrecy keeps diminish-
ing even as the value of vulnerable technical outputs keeps rising, with 
a general purpose liability rule that would directly address the market 
failure to which incremental innovation bearing know-how on its face is 
otherwise susceptible. It is this premise that underlies the 'compensatory 
liability regime', first developed in Green Tulips.46 Ideally, its adoption 
would render the hybrid regimes of exclusive rights in Zone 3 of Figure 8.1 
superfluous and lead to their rt::peal over time. 
Under a compensatory liability regime, a small-scale innovator who 
operates in Zone 2 would obtain protection against wholesale duplication 
for a specified period of time. However, that innovator would also labor 
under an obligation to allow second comers to use his or her know-how for 
purposes of making improvements, in exchange for a reasonable royalty 
to be paid over a specified, but relatively short, period of time. Under this 
regime, there is an ex ante entitlement, in tl}e form of an automatic license, 
for compensation from follow-on innovators; but there is no possibility of 
excluding the second comer from making those improvements. If many 
improvers emerge, the first'comer may experience lottery effects from the 
44 Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001); Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc. 529 U.S. 205 (2000); Bonito Boats, Inc. 
v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989). 
45 Reichman, Green Tulips, supra note 19; see also Jerome H. Reichman, Of 
Green Tulips and Legal Kudzu: Repackaging Rights in Subpatentable Innovation, in 
EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL 1;>ROPERTY 23 (Rochelle Dreyfuss et 
al. eds., Oxford University Press, 2001). 
46 See Reichman, Green Tulips, supra note 19, at 177-97. 
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contributions of his de facto partners, and that same first comer may also 
utilize some of their improvements to advance his or her own competitive 
position by paying a corresponding reasonable tithe in exchange.47 
I will not delve more deeply into the intricacies of a 'compensatory 
liability regime' within the confines of this short chapter on the legal logic 
of trade secrecy law. Suffice it to say, this proposed regime attempts to 
address the biggest problem facing trade secrecy law today, which is not 
its lack of systemic logic, but its growing inability to function in a world 
without significant secrecy in important sectors of technological innova-
tion. Absent such an alternative regime, we may expect to witness a contin-
uing unraveling of the trade secrecy paradigm, with mounting aberrations, 
such as the ctiminalization of trade secrecy law in the United States48 and 
the adoption of an exclusive right to trade secrets in Italy.49 To the extent 
that these and other aberrations cumulatively exert a chilling effect on 
innovation, we end up more or less where market failures from too milch 
free riding would otherwise have carried us in the raw state of affairs. 
In contrast, the compensatory liability model seeks to replace a time-
tested liability rule rooted in secrecy with a portable liability nile covering 
applications of knoW-how to industry that is detached from the require-
ment of secrecy (but not that of a modicum of novelty). It can thus co-exist 
with trade secrecy law and allow small-scale innovators two different, but 
pro-competitive options. If the innovator chooses the compensatory liabil-
ity regime, it will provide him or het with more or less the same remedies 
as trade secrecy law. It would inhibit wholesale duplication as a dishonest 
form of reverse engineering,50 and allow second comers to 'pay' for less-
ened lead time advantages by investing in improvements of their own and 
then sharing some of the resulting profits with the first comer. 
CONCLUSION 
I will end by noting four additional benefits likely to flow from adoption 
of a compensatory liability Tegime for small-scale innovation. First, such 
a second-tier regime would actually reinforce the courts' willingness to 
47 For details, see generally Reichman, Green Tulips, supra note 19, at 177-90. 
48 Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Trade Secrets: flow Well Should We be Allowed 
to Hide Them? The Economic Espionage Act of 1996,9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. L.], 1(1998). 
49 See Ghidini & FaIce, Chapter 6, 
50 See Samuelson and Scotchmer, supra note I (analysis of plug mold statutes 
in this regard). 
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maintain a stiff non-obviousness standard, and dms remove the clutter 
that accumulates both upstream and downstream when weak patents are 
issued. The existence of a second-tier liability rule would reinforce the 
judges' scrutiny of obviousness, by assuring them that those innovations 
that fail the test will nonetheless be rescued from wholesale duplication 
and free riding forms of market failure (without fostering corresponding 
barriers to entry). This could prove to be of particular benefit to the infor-
mation technology sector, which has been suffocating under the weight of 
too many patents, but which seems ever more comfortable witl~ existing 
uses of liability rules. 
Second, resort to a compensatory liability rule for small-scale innova-
tion should obviate the need for adding more hybrid regimes of exclusive 
property rights to Zone 3, where the cumulative social costs are becoming 
unsustainable. Third, once set in place, a compensatory liability model 
can be adapted to the needs of different industries without damage to 
its basic mechanisms Just as the semiconductor chip industry had some 
particular understanding about the boundaries of reverse engineering in 
the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984,51 so different sectors can 
contractually adjust the liability model to their own needs, within outer 
limits set by legislators, relevant regulators or industry governance boards 
(when an industry voluntarily adopts a liability rule for itselO. 
Finally, once a compensatory liability regime becomes a more famil-
iar alternative intellectual property model, it can be adapted to address 
numerous problems at the margins that may otherwise seem intractable. 
For example, in previous articles, I have tried to show how such a liability 
rule could resolve hard problems encountered with respect to traditional 
knowledge, 52 clinical trial data,53 and the quest for an acceptable form of 
database protection. 54 This regime also has a promising future in support-
ing the formation of pooled inputs for scientific research where the possi-
bility of downstream applications might otherwise undermine the sharing 
norms of science. 55 
51 Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984 (SCPA), title HI of Pub. L. No. 
98-620,98 Stat. 3335, 3347 (November 8, 1984) codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-14 
(§906 expressly permits reverse engineering); see also Raskind, Semiconductor Chip 
Act, supra note 21. 
52 Reichman and Lewis, supra note 15. 
53 Reichman, Role of Clinical Trial Data, supra note 5. 
54 Jerome H. Reichman and Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights 
in Data?, 50 VAND. L. R_EV. 51, 145-51 (1997); Reichman and Uhlir, supra note 27. 
55 Arti K. Rai et al., Pathways Across the Valley of Death: Novel Intellectual 
Property Strategies for Accelerated Drug Discovery, 8 YALE J. HEALTH POL'y L. & 
ETHICS 1,25-8 (2008); see also Jerome H. Reichman, Tom Dedeurwaerdere aDd 
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In this regard, at least one important international treaty concerning 
plant genetic resources for food and agriculture has actually embodied 
a rudimentary model of such a compensatory liability regime. 56 Efforts 
are underway to develop a more refined application of such a regime to 
microbial science in order to mediate between the demands of developing 
countries for control of their local genetic resources and the needs of the 
worldwide scientific community. 57 It also seems likely that liability rules 
could play an important role in enabling developing countries to accom-
modate patented climate-change technologies to their own needs over 
time. 58 
Paul F. Uhlir, Designing the Microbial Research Commons: Global Intellectual 
Property Strategies for Accessing, and Using Essential Public Knowledge Assets, 
ch. 2 (Draft version, February 2, 2011) (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
authors). 
56 International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, 
November 3, 2001, available at www.fao.org/legal/treaties/033f-e.htm; Laurence 
R. Helfer, Using Intellectual Property Rights to Preserve the Global Genetic 
Commons: The International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY, 
supra note IS, at 217-24. 
57 Reichman, Dedeurwaerdere and Uhlir, supra note 55, chs. 2 and 6. 
58 See, e.g., Jerome Reichman, Arti K. Rai, Richard G. Newell and Jonathan 
B. Wiener, Intellectual Property and Alternatives: Strategies for Green Innovation, 
Chatham House Energy, Environment and Development Programme, Paper No. 
OS/03 (200S), available at www.chathamhouse.org.uk/filesI13097_120Seedp_duke. 
pdf. 
